Afghanistan

Hague caught in the middle

When General Petraeus called for a “united effort” on Afghanistan earlier, he might as well have been addressing our government.  Between David Cameron’s and Liam Fox’s recent statements, there’s a clear sense that the coalition is pulling in two separate directions.  And it’s left William Hague explaining our Afghan strategy thus, to the Times today: “‘The position on combat troops is as the Prime Minister set out last weekend. By the time of the next election, he hopes we won’t still be fighting on the ground. We are working towards the Afghan national security forces being able to stand on their own two feet by 2014,’ but there is ‘no

Hague is an administrative revolutionary, not the second Canning

For a man of such rhetorical talents, William Hague’s foreign policy speech was strikingly bland. His eloquence escaped him and he sounded like David Miliband – earnest, conscientious and often unintelligible. The similarity didn’t end there. Hague was very pleased with his observation that a multi-lateral world requires bi-lateral relationships; but even David Miliband had grasped that – who could forget his stable shin-dig in India? Hague’s speech was dominated by the expression ‘network world’ and he said that Britain’s diplomacy must address new strategic needs. In fact, Hague said very little that was new. Britain’s relationship with America would remain close; European alliances would rest on co-operation not coercion;

Afghan manoeuvres

Ming Campbell’s comments today show that some Liberal Democrats do believe in Fox hunting. Responding to Fox’s speech in Washington yesterday and his remark that Britain would be among the last to leave Afghanistan, Campbell told the Daily Politics that the “intervention was unhelpful, indeed the government thought it was unhelpful.” “It would have been better if these remarks had not been made.” Dr Fox’s allies are less than pleased by Ming’s grandstanding. They take the not unreasonable view that the Secretary of State for Defence has every right to express his views on a war that this country is fighting without being second guessed by a backbencher from the

A new foreign policy?

An inventive article from Ben Brogan this morning, arguing that a new vigorously Tory foreign policy is emerging. I can be a little slow sometimes, but I haven’t noticed anything new or Tory about Britain’s foreign policy. Brogan records that the Prime Minister has let it be known that British troops will withdraw from Afghanistan by 2015. Cameron said nothing of the sort; he said he wanted British troops out of Afghanistan by 2015, something quite different. Contrary to expectations, relations with Europe are flourishing under the coalition, as pragmatic government has superseded bellicose opposition. William Hague hopes to influence the EU closely. In a speech today, he will attempt

If you were William Hague’s speechwriter what would you want him to say?

“The Foreign and Commonwealth Office requests the honour of your company at a major address by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, The Rt Hon William Hague MP,’Britain’s Foreign Policy in a networked world’.” Thus reads the invitation from the Foreign Office. If emails could be gold-embossed, this one probably would be. The speech on Thursday is the Foreign Secretary’s first major speech in London. Colleagues like Liam Fox and Andrew Mitchell have already kept their speech-writers busy, but until now the Foreign Secretary has only done the odd interview, and one address (in Sarajevo).  He did  however open the European Affairs debate in the House of

Harman the hawk

Harriet Harman’s response to David Cameron’s statement on the G8 and G20 was noticeable for her attacking the Prime Minister for talking about bringing British troops home from Afghanistan within five years. Her criticism was that talking about withdrawal undermined the troops in the field, she sounded more like John McCain than I ever expected Harriet Harman to. She chose to reinforce her point by using quotes from Liam Fox about the effect that timelines have on military morale. Her use of the Fox quotes suggests that Labour see the Cameron Fox relationship as a weak point in the government. Certainly, Ben Brogan’s blog and Conservative Home’s description of the

Cameron meant what he said on Afghanistan

Although David Cameron said later that he didn’t mean it, there was no mistaking the sincerity when he told Adam Boulton that “We cannot be there for another five years having effectively been there for nine years already”. In my News of the World column  today, I say that it’s pretty clear his Afghan strategy is to secure the earliest dignified exit. But I also say that this does not necessarily bode ill for defence more widely. I gather that George Osborne, fresh from the success of his Budget last week, is working on a plan that will freeze defence budget in cash terms (an 11% real terms cut over

The G8 doesn’t mark a change in strategy towards Afghanistan

Has the G8 agreed a five-year deadline for getting out of Afghanistan? This is the Politics Home headline, and that of other publications. Either there are some Chinese whispers going on – or some British spin. None of the foreign media appear to have discerned a new strategy – but for Brits it chimes with what Cameron was saying yesterday that he wanted to be out after five years. In fact, the full text of the G8 agreement reads as follows… The Kabul Conference in July will be an important opportunity for the Government of Afghanistan to present its detailed plans and show tangible progress in implementing the commitments made

James Forsyth

Why Obama did not consider pulling out of Afghanistan

The implosion of General McChrsytal’s career has refocused attention on Afghanistan. Reading Peggy Noonan’s column on the subject I was struck by this paragraph reflecting on Jonathan Alter’s reporting of Obama’s decision making process when he ordered the surge: More crucially, the president asked policy makers, in Mr. Alter’s words, “If the Taliban took Kabul and controlled Afghanistan, could it link up with Pakistan’s Taliban and threaten command and control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons?” The answer: Quite possibly yes. Mr. Alter: “Early on, the President eliminated withdrawal (from Afghanistan) as an option, in part because of a new classified study on what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal if the

Unwinnable war?

Today is Armed Forces Day, and I don’t recall seeing such collective negativity from newspapers and broadcasters on the Afghan war.  It borders on despair. Most news outlets have dissected David Cameron’s comments yesterday, where he could only offer the hope that troops would be withdrawn by the end of this parliament. Cameron’s non-committal answers, the regular drip of casualties and the sense that the surge has become a slog have led journalists and analysts to conclude, en masse, that the war is unwinnable.   Three interviews are particularly striking. Nick Harvey, the armed forces minister, re-iterated Cameron’s comments in the exact same terms. As I argued yesterday, the vague

Cameron wants troops out of Afghanistan by 2015

Everything about the Cameron government comes in fives. Five year terms, a five-year coalition and now we learn that it is Cameron’s considered opinion that British troops cannot remain Afghanistan for another five years. All Cameron has offered is the hope that troops will be home before the proposed May 2015 election. Five more years in Helmand on the current trajectory would be extremely costly and unpopular, especially given the political pressure surrounding defence cuts. Cameron realises this but will the nature of Britain’s engagement change? The assumption was that Britain would mirror President Obama’s timetable and begin a gradual withdrawal next year. That political and military strategy depended on

Alex Massie

Afghan Hearts and Minds are Decided

A terrific, if gloomy, Afghanistan dispatch from William Dalrymple, published by our friends over at the New Statesman. I don’t know how useful comparisons with the First Afghan War are but the psychology of occupation is a different matter: The following morning in Jalalabad, we went to a jirga, or assembly of tribal elders, to which the greybeards of Gandamak had come under a flag of truce to discuss what had happened the day before. The story was typical of many I heard about the current government, and revealed how a mixture of corruption, incompetence and insensitivity has helped give an opening for the return of the once-hated Taliban. As

Talking to the Taliban is key – but no magic formula

The proverbial shoe is dropping. Following General Stanley McChrystal’s forced retirement, a consensus is forming that President Obama’s Afghan strategy is not working. The Economist says: ‘Since November, when Mr Obama promised 30,000 more of his country’s soldiers to the campaign, little has gone right. General McChrystal’s plan was for a “surge” that would seize the initiative from the Taliban and create the scope for Afghanistan’s government, backed by its army and police, to take charge. In practice that has not happened.’ In the Financial Times, Ahmed Rashid makes a similar point, arguing that the military strategy in Afghanistan is “failing”. ‘The real crisis, however, is that the US-Nato strategy

Hail to the chief

How wrong I was. President Obama, lambasted by his critics for being ponderous, has acted with lightening speed: less than 24 hours after that Rolling Stone article, General Stanley McChrystal was forced out of his job in place of the only person that could pick up where he left off, namely General David Petraeus. In acting swiftly, the US president has moved to restore the authority and respect his position as Commander-in-Chief deserves; and he has begun to re-establish the kind of civil-military relations that need to exist in militarily-capable liberal democracies like the United States.   What effect the change of commander will have in Kabul remains unclear. But

The McChrystal Affair

Yesterday there was some chatter that the smart thing would be for General Stanley McChrystal to offer his resignation but for President Barack Obama to decline it. That had the advantage of cuteness, but I’m not sure it was ever feasible and not least because, as best I can tell, the more military-minded an observer is the more certain they were that the general had to go. It is not, evidently, an ideal situation. Of course it isn’t, it’s Afghanistan. Nevertheless, from both a political and military perspective replacing McChrystal with General David Petraeus is as close to a win-win result as its possible to salvage from this clusterfuck brouhaha.

General concern

The Taliban are expanding their area of influence, NATO allies are eager to leave Afghanistan, the forthcoming parliamentary elections are likely to be even more fraudulent than last year’s presidential election – in other words, how can it get any worse for President Obama’s AfPak strategy? Oh yeah, the man the US president has trusted to execute the strategy, the man whose name is now synonymous with the international community’s’ plan, General Stanley McChrystal gives an interview to Rolling Stone magazine (in itself a dubious choice), which paints a picture of the commander as insubordinate, unwise or simply not in control of his headquarters. The fact that everyone has rushed

Seeing it through

David Cameron’s address to the House contained no surprises. NATO and its allies are 6 months into a strategy to stabilise Afghanistan. All sides of the House were agreed that Britain should fulfil its commitments, but remain in Afghanistan not a day longer than necessary. That date is unknown. Like Blair and Brown before him, Cameron aspires to ‘improve Afghan security’. ‘Stability’ surely means the expulsion of al Qaeda from Afghanistan. How likely is that without the complete co-operation of the Taliban? (At what cost would that be secured?) And, as Julian Lewis MP pointed out, is al Qaeda more dangerous in Afghanistan than it is The Yemen, Somalia or

Defence matters

Sir Jock Stirrup’s early departure was one of the worst kept secrets in Westminster. But the ‘resignation’ could have been better handled. The coalition has created a lame duck in Stirrup. And, rightly, Con Coughlin asks why Stirrup is overseeing the strategic defence review if he was sufficiently inept as CDS? It makes no sense, as removing Stirrup and Sir Bill Jeffrey (the MoD’s permanent secretary) is clearly about preparing the way for spending cuts and a new model of UK military intervention. Liam Fox gave a speech this morning promising a ‘clean break with the Cold War mindset’. He emphasised the importance of maintaining counter-insurgency spending and training; presumably,

Pakistan: friend or foe?

One of the biggest obstacles for NATO in Afghanistan has been the role of Pakistan and its intelligence apparatus in supporting the Taliban insurgency. Officially, the Pakistani government deny backing the Taliban insurgency, but even Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General David Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command, have said they suspect Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence service of being engaged in anti-NATO activities. Now, a new report by the Harvard-based analyst and former head of OXFAM in Kabul, Matt Waldman, takes the accusations to a new level. ‘The relationship, in fact, goes far beyond contact and coexistence, with some assistance provided by elements within,

Did the bureaucrats lose the war?

The Times went big on their story of Britain’s campaign in Helmand, and all the mistakes made in 2005 when the deployment was being planned. It is a good piece of reporting, which adds to the volume of stories about the war, its planning and execution. Britain’s effort Helmand, like the one in Basra, will in time need a magisterial study, a sort of multi-volume study like Winston Churchill’s The Second World War, which can weave the front-line experience together with the turning of the bureaucratic wheels. But at least the first draft of history is now being written. The articles make some mistakes and quotes people who did not