Afghanistan

Cameron’s close shave

As Paul Goodman notes, being Prime Minister means taking risks. So perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised to read in the Times (£) that, during his recent trip to Afghanistan, the security threat to David Cameron was more urgent than previously thought: “At the time Downing Street played down the incident, saying that it should not be seen as a huge security issue. But The Times can reveal that senior military figures are demanding changes to the way in which future visits to war zones by Mr Cameron and other senior Whitehall figures are conducted. They believe that the Taleban knew which helicopter was carrying Mr Cameron and are deeply concerned

General Conway versus the Commander-in-Chief

President Obama’s folly in setting a fixed date to start troop withdrawals from Afghanistan has been highlighted by the US Marine General James Conway. He told reporters on Tuesday that Obama’s July 2011 start date for withdrawal was “probably giving our enemy sustenance….In fact, we’ve intercepted communications that say, ‘Hey, you know, we only have to hold out for so long.’” As Mark Mardell noted on the Today programme, after having relieved General McChrystal of the Afghan command for his criticism of the civilian leadership Obama is keen to avoid another clash with a member of the senior brass. So there will be no White House reprimand for Conway. But

Strategic differences

When President Obama asked General Petraeus to take over the Afghan command after General McChrystal’s Rolling Stone implosion, there was much speculation that the two men would clash over the date for America to begin withdrawing troops. Obama had set down July 2011 as the starting point but Petraeus was almost certainly going to want more time than that. In Petraeus’s Meet the Press interview on Sunday, Petraeus made clear he might argue that withdrawal cannot begin that quickly ‘MR. GREGORY:  I just want to clarify this.  Did — could you reach that point and say, “I know that the process is supposed to begin, but my assessment as the

Battling for hearts and minds

This week marked the 38th anniversary of the American ground withdrawal from Vietnam. At the time The Spectator ran the following leader, condemning the Pentagon’s often inhuman conduct of the war, which it deemed counter-productive. Reading the piece, it becomes plain that the conduct of war has changed beyond recognition. Modern strategists have dispensed with napalm and have embraced aid and development instead. Whatever Julian Assange might intimate, Afghanistan is emphatically not a re-run of Vietnam.     ‘Thinking About War The more our think tank men think about war, the worse our wars become. Sophistication means worse. Men thinking in tanks brood upon killing trees. We know it is silly:

Progress in Afghanistan?

The Times (£) is reporting that ISAF has made a significant progress in pacifying the death circle around Sangin. The key, it seems, is driving a wedge between the tribal insurgents and religious insurgents foreign to Helmand: ‘British commanders believe that they are close to achieving a significant tribal uprising against the Taleban that could lead to the reintegration of hundreds of insurgents fighting around Sangin, the most dangerous place in Afghanistan. The number of violent incidents in Sangin has fallen by about 80 per cent in the past month. British commanders believe that this is partly the result of tribal leaders delivering on a promise to restrain tribal elements

Zardari drops a rhetorical bombshell

David Cameron isn’t the only world leader who can lob rhetorical hand-grenades about the struggle in Afghanistan, you know. Speaking ahead of his visit to the UK, Pakistan’s President Zardari has said that the “international community … is in the process of losing the war against the Taliban.” Adding that, “And that is, above all, because we have lost the battle for hearts and minds.” Given his pivotal, front-seat role in proceedings, it’s got to go down as one of the most significant statements on the war so far. Is this intended as a riposte to Cameron’s remark about Pakistan and terrorism? I’m not sure. In the same interview, Zardari

The past few weeks have made the struggle in Afghanistan even more difficult

Domestically speaking, it has been an encouraging week from the coalition. Internationally speaking, less so. And today we see the first real rush of fallout from David Cameron’s appearance on the world stage, as the Pakistani intelligence agency cancels a visit to London, “in reaction to the comments made by the British Prime Minister against Pakistan.” It’s not the kind of development that we should exaggerate –after all, it still looks likely that President Zardari will visit Cameron next week, even if officials in Pakistan have been wavering on that front. But we shouldn’t underestimate it either. The main reason to worry is, largely, one of personality. The Times runs

Pakistan’s double game in Afghanistan

So what is Pakistan up to? Cameron has a point: it is playing a dangerous double game which I once outlined in a piece. But in today’s Spectator, it is all spelled out by a writer who is – in my view – the best authority on this mess and by some margin. Ahmed Rashid, whose book Descent into Chaos is the definitive work on the Afghan war, explains that Karzai has effectively switched sides – he’s given up on Nato (as, it seems, has Cameron) and now wants Pakistan to preside over talks with the Taliban: ” A few months ago Hamid Karzai would have been thrilled to have

WikiLeaks rightly suffers a backlash

Is it just me, or is there something deeply unsettling about Julian Assange’s comments in the Times today? After the paper revealed yesterday that the leaked Afghan War files could easily put informants’ lives at risk, the WikiLeaks founder sets about defending his decision to publish them – and he does so in dangerously complacent terms. Take his opening proclamation, where he says: “No one has been harmed, but should anyone come to harm of course that would be a matter of deep regret — our goal is justice to innocents, not to harm them. That said, if we were forced into a position of publishing all of the archives

Cameron lambasts Pakistan whilst on Indian trade mission. Bad move

Oh for the days of inactive prime ministers. After yesterday’s hot-headedness about Gaza, comes an even more deliberately pointed statement. Cameron said: ‘[Pakistan] should not be allowed to promote the export of terror whether to India, whether to Afghanistan or to anywhere else in the world.’ I agree, providing of course it is established that the Pakistani state is fomenting terror and the Wikileaks revelations do not give that impression. That said, the Pakistan government is responsible for all of its agents, and they should curb S-Wing’s collusion with the Taliban and its affiliates in Waziristan. Cameron and Obama are right to press the Pakistani authorities. But a goodwill tour

Few smoking guns in these leaks

Courtesy of WikiLeaks, the Guardian and The New York Times have obtained classified documents pertaining to the killing of civilians in Afghanistan and the duplicity of Pakistani spies. The White House is furious, condemning the leaks for ‘endangering US and allied servicemen’ on active duty – a statement that seems reasonable until the White House added that the documents pre-dated President Obama’s assumption of office and that they ‘do not reflect current on-ground realities’. But that makes the allegations contained therein irrelevant or dated. Judging by the two newspapers’ coverage, the leaks are vague and certainly not novel. It’s obvious that Pakistan is an unwilling ally, and one which has its

The RAF is in danger of being destroyed on the ground

Liam Fox is anticipating the Strategic Defence Review, preparing the services for what will be extremely bad news. Britain will not engage in large scale operations in the immediate future. The Telegraph reports that officials intend to reduce the number of strike aircraft, warships and tanks. Future strategic emphasis will be on maximising firepower and range and minimising direct and associated costs. The service arms have mobilised their writers to prepare a defence. The Times have hosted a set-to between Air-Vice Marshall Tony Mason and Major General Julian Thompson. Mason’s argument is simple: warfare is determined by air superiority. He writes: ‘Since Dunkirk, British Armed Forces have usually fought beneath

Out by 2014

It remains a hope, but Hamid Karzai wants his country to control its own security by 2014. Karzai echoes the MoD’s stance – revealed at the weekend courtesy of a leaked internal communiqué. Surely this is more than coincidence? 2014 would seem to be NATO’s preferred withdrawal date. At last, the politicians have dispelled some of the indecision which has marred operations recently. With politicians beginning to agree to stay until at least 2014 and having bolstered aid budgets, the military can now concentrate on ‘stabilising’ incendiary parts of the country. Whether it will receive the resources needed to protect reconstruction and secure lasting stability remains to be seen –

A special relationship in the making?

I’ve spent the morning contending with the WSJ’s Heath Robinson-esque subscription service so you don’t have to. Inside the paper, David Cameron explains what the Special Relationship means to him. 1). The Special Relationship is close and robust because British and American values are essentially the same, which explains why our national interests are often aligned: ‘The U.S.-U.K. relationship is simple: It’s strong because it delivers for both of us. The alliance is not sustained by our historical ties or blind loyalty. This is a partnership of choice that serves our national interests.’ There may be differences in emphasis and application, but, Cameron argues, Britain and America stand together on Afghanistan, global

The chaos of military deadlines

The leaked communiqué, obtained by the Independent on Sunday, stating that British troops will not be fighting in Afghanistan by 2014 has further confused the Afghan war at a time when clarity is necessary.  There are now two deadlines, or aspirations of a withdrawal at any rate. Liam Fox is polluting the airwaves with specious waffle about 2015 being a ‘conservative assessment’, but of course the troops will probably be home earlier, but then again they might not, but then again we don’t really know. Well, Dr Fox, if that’s the case it’s best to say nothing. Amid this disorder, Andrew Mitchell has announced that aid to Afghanistan will be

James Forsyth

Mitchell’s right move

Andrew Mitchell’s decision to prioritise Afghanistan in the development budget is sensible. It demonstrates that Mitchell, a former soldier, understands that the Britain’s overseas aid needs to be in support of Britain’s foreign policy objectives. The Observer reports that Mitchell will announce a 40 percent increase in the Afghan aid budget. This will be paid for both by the increase in development spending and by reducing aid to countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America. I also understand that Mitchell has been emphasising to his department that it needs to work better with the military. For too long, there has been a culture at DFID that has seen it as

Cameron: 2015 is a “long term cut-off point” for troops in Afghanistan

Remember when David Cameron said that Britain “cannot be [in Afghanistan] for another five years“?  Since then, the coalition has expended a good deal of energy trying to clarify this statement.  The latest formulation was something like that given by William Hague to the Telegraph a couple of weeks ago: “By the time of the next election, [Cameron] hopes we won’t still be fighting on the ground … but there is ‘no strict or artificial timetable’.” But now Cameron has brought up the 2015 date again, and this time it sounds a lot more like a pledge than a hope.  Here’s what he said at a PM Direct event today:

Concentration not capitulation

There is a difference between a withdrawal and a retreat. Through no fault of its own, the British army was defeated in Basra and retreated. British troops will withdraw from Sangin in October to be re-deployed to bolster Britain’s main presence in central Afghanistan. Any attempt to present this decision as politically motivated, heralding the start of a British retreat from Afghanistan, should be rejected. British forces have not ‘lost’ in Sangin, or been deemed too ‘soft’ for the task. This is a military decision, inaugurating the surge’s next phase. The logic is flawless. Troops in Helmand have been spread to thin; the Americans and British are concentrating their forces